

Refugee policy: When an emergency rule becomes *the* rule: Evidence from Italy.

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Abstract. In 2011, to manage the exceptional flow of refugees escaping North Africa, the Italian government released the North Africa Emergency Provisions, temporarily relaxing refugee policies for some categories of asylum seekers. By using data from an important charity, we perform difference-in-differences estimations in order to investigate the impact of this emergency rule on the probability of migrants regularizing their legal status. Results show that the emergency provisions increased the number of successful applications in favor of eligible individuals, while dramatically boosting the denial rate for other migrants. This suggests that some migrants suffered displacement due to the emergency rules. We discuss the possible causes from a policy perspective.

Keywords: Migration policy; Italy; difference-in-differences; multilevel analysis; Bayesian models

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1. Introduction

Immigration to Italy is a phenomenon that has become especially relevant over the last few decades (Bonifazi et al. 2009, de Haas 2008, Del Boca&Venturini 2005, Zincone 2006, Klepp 2010). Recently, it has been greatly affected by an exceptional influx of citizens from North African countries, mostly generated by the 2011 civil war in Libya, as well as by political turmoil in Egypt and stemming from the *Maghreb* (the so-called Arab Spring). Later, asylum seekers from Syria represented a new impressive phenomenon of migration to Italy.

In 2011, given the emergency represented by the first intense flow of people from North Africa, the Italian government adopted temporary measures of humanitarian protection in favor of asylum seekers from this area. The emergency rules added complexity to the already articulated legal framework regulating the legal status of both refugees and migrants in Italy.

The aim of this study is to perform an empirical analysis, in order to investigate whether – besides the expected effects on the eligible asylum seekers – though enacted to manage a specific situation, the emergency provisions have affected also other migrants requesting residence permits.

Difference-in-differences (DID) estimations provide evidence that this temporary emergency rule have indeed increased the rate of success in obtaining a refugee residence permit among ENA-eligible asylum seekers. Conversely, we also find that migrants not entitled to such provisions suffered a dramatic surge in the application denial rate.

At least three non-mutually exclusive drivers of this displacement effect can be conjectured. First, the exceptional number of applications submitted by ENA-eligible refugees may have congested the administrative system, eventually displacing ordinary applications. Second, some migrants – especially those not eligible for the ENA protection – may have unsuccessfully submitted ENA-oriented applications; this might have been due either to an attempt to strategically exploit the relaxation of rules implied by the enactment of the emergency provisions, or to their misinterpretation of the ENA regime. Finally, a (more or less) tacit policy of rationing may have contributed to the moderate granting of ordinary residence permits.⁴ Further investigation is thus needed to verify how these hypothetical drivers actively contributed to an implicit tightening of migration policies against migrants not entitled to the ENA protections – a phenomenon clearly suggested by the results of our empirical analysis.

This work is organized as follows. The next section presents the regulatory framework where the experimental setting emerged; Section 3 presents the dataset used in the analysis. Section 4 uses DID techniques to estimate the effects of the ENA provisions on various categories of treated groups of applicants for a residence permit; it also discusses the econometric results. Section 5 briefly discusses the potential

⁴The explicit use of quotas aimed at dealing with requests for international or humanitarian protection would in some sense represent a breach of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR, also known as the Geneva Convention, 1951) and European Directives. This kind of restriction, instead, is used by the Italian government in the case of migrant workers, with quotas annually established by Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers (cf. Art. 3, par. 4, D.lgs. No. 286/1998).

drivers of the displacement effect that has been empirically identified; it also offers some preliminary policy implications and concluding remarks.

2. Residence permit administration in Italy

All migrants in Italy face a number of specific legal and administrative issues. In particular, in order to stay legally in the country, non-European Union (EU) migrants are required to hold a residence permit (*permesso di soggiorno*).

In principle, two independent and alternative systems regulate the release of residence permits. One is for asylum seekers and refugees (hereafter “refugee system”), whereas the other system is for all the other migrants who migrate for working, studying, family, and health reasons (hereafter “ordinary system”).⁵

More specifically, the Italian migration law (Law No. 722/1954, D.lgs. No. 286/1998, and D.lgs. No. 251/2007) establishes three different types of residence permit for foreign citizens seeking refuge; these are released by the competent territorial Commissions. Accordingly, on the basis of an individual interview, an applicant may alternatively be qualified by the Commission for the status of refugee (“maximum protection”), for subsidiary protection (“intermediate level”), or for humanitarian protection (“minimum level”). In the case of a successful application, the applicant can legally remain in the country for five/three years if she (he) is recognized as requiring refugee status/subsidiary protection, or for one year when only humanitarian protection is granted. All these permits are renewable if the relevant requisites continue to be satisfied.

According to the ordinary system, the State Police releases residence permits for working, studying, family and health reasons. These permits can be obtained provided the applicant has a valid passport (with a valid entry visa, if required) and documents supporting the request for the type of residence permit he/she is applying for (i.e. a working contract etc.). Typically, migrants can undertake by themselves to submit the applications, mainly by following Internet-based procedures. Nonetheless anecdotal evidence suggests that many people experience difficulties in handling these applications. In some cases, payment is required,⁶ and not all the necessary information is provided in a variety of languages. Moreover, required documents supporting the application are many and complex (for instance, in the case of applications for family reasons, the possibility to maintain family members must be proved).

In general, both for the refugee system and the ordinary system, procedures and protocols are intricate; regulation details change frequently, and even legal practitioners and the authors have found that compliance with migration regulation is not easy.

⁵ The main legislative source for Italian migration regulation is the “Consolidated Act on Immigration Laws”, D.lgs. No. 286/1998 (the so-called Turco–Napolitano law, amended in 2002 by the so-called Bossi–Fini law), which was enacted in 1998 but has been significantly updated through the inclusion of new and specific provisions. It is worth noticing that while refugee system is regulated according to the international law about refugees and asylum seekers, the ordinary regime is based only on national laws.

⁶ For example, some residence permits – including those for family reasons and those for work purposes – involve payments ranging from EUR80 to EUR200 (plus EUR14.62 in electronic stamps).

Although the government does provide support tools including help-desks in the city halls of the major towns – migrants typically try to fill institutional gaps by relying on informal networks (e.g., family and friends) or the help of charities. In Milan, the second-largest city in Italy which hosts vibrant communities of foreign citizens⁷ the *Casa della Carità* (hereafter, CdC) is a significant example of a charity that provides this kind of legal assistance. Especially in recent years (2010–2013), dispensing advice with respect to applications for residence permits has become a predominant activity among legal advisors at CdC (cf. par. 1).

Although the refugee and the ordinary systems are alternative, we cannot exclude the possibility that, on the occasion of their arrival to Italy, migrants often tend to apply for permits that are nominally intended to manage asylum-seeking procedures regardless to the fact of being actually eligible. Actually, the condition of an asylum-seeking person is generally perceived as a “trick” by which the migrant tries to receive temporary legal status regularization. Migrants who are in Italy for working or family reasons might prefer applying through the refuge system rather than through the ordinary one even when eligible for an ordinary residence permit. In fact, applicants for asylum can legally stay in the country until their case is definitely decided (the Italian law also provides the right to appeal decisions of denial).⁸ Such a bias may seriously put at risk the “physiology” of the ordinary system, as requests for protection may be spurred by other “concealed” intentions (for example, legally staying in Italy for the time needed to find either regular or irregular employment, or even move to another European country).⁹

Italy’s legal framework became more complex when the government had to deal with the large number of migrants who fled to Italy when political turmoil in the *Maghreb* and the Libyan civil war erupted.¹⁰ At first, the Italian government responded to the crisis by declaring a state of emergency.¹¹ On April 5, 2011, recognizing the exceptional situation in North Africa, the government adopted temporary measures of humanitarian protection in favor of the refugees from North Africa (*Emergenza Nord Africa*, hereafter, ENA).¹² The ENA provisions, in fact, temporarily relaxed the refugee system: consequently, migrants who fled from North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) to Italy in the relevant period (January 1–April 5, 2011)¹³ were *automatically* granted a temporary residence permit for

⁸ On continuous change of status among migrants in Italy, see Schuster (2006).

⁹ Given its position as a link between the Mediterranean Sea and Europe, Italy is notoriously regarded by many migrants as an obligatory “point of passage” to northern European countries.

¹⁰ In the first nine months of 2011 more than 60,000 migrants fled to Italy (cf. Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, October 6, 2011).

¹¹ The Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, February 12, 2011, declared a state of emergency for the entire Italian territory, in order to face “the exceptional influx of citizens from North African countries.” This state of emergency was later extended both to the territory of North Africa and to other African countries, and prolonged until December 31, 2012.

¹² According to Art. 20, D.lgs. No. 286/1998, temporary measures of protection may be established, by Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, in exceptional circumstances, such as armed conflict, natural disaster, and other serious situations in non-EU countries. Prior to the crisis in North Africa, this rule had been applied only once, during the Kosovo conflict in 1999.

¹³ Note that only migrants who entered Italy before April 5 (date of the ENA decree) could apply for the specific protection regime. Hence, it is unlikely that the ENA enactment has been a cause of migrant influx as a means of taking advantage of associated benefits.

humanitarian reasons.¹⁴ Due to exceptional mass starvations occurring in Kenya, Uganda, and the Horn of Africa, this regime was soon extended to migrants from other African countries (August 3, 2011). Finally, the duration of the emergency was prolonged, given the persistent instability in North Africa;¹⁵ however, unlike citizens of North African countries and those of the Horn of Africa who were immediately and clearly protected by the ENA provisions the situation for Sub-Saharan Africans was rather unclear until October 30, 2012.¹⁶

The surge of residence permits released in 2011 for asylum and humanitarian reasons to migrants from North Africa and the Horn (hereafter, NAH migrants) is indeed evident in Fig. A.1 in the Appendix, which shows the number of residence permits granted to foreign citizens who arrived in Italy in 2009 and 2011 from the 20 most represented non-EU countries (data are aggregated in terms of macro-regions.)

Further difficulties emerged in the handling of the crisis when it became clear that this temporary special protection regime had been exploited by non-eligible migrants. In particular, there is the perception that those who had not entered Italy in the relevant period (for example, people who had already been in the country irregularly) tried to take advantage of the emergency situation to acquire a permit to regularize their status.¹⁷ More generally, cheating by non-eligible migrants regarding either their time of arrival in Italy or country of origin¹⁸ could be identified as one of the factors responsible for the congestion of the entire administrative system.

As a matter of fact, continuous amendments and the release of updated regulatory provisions regarding the African emergency were a clear expression of serious difficulties faced by the Italian government in early 2011. The considerable institutional effort expended to provide effective ENA-based protection to refugees from North Africa has consequently resulted in the last few years in a very complicated picture of Italian migration and refugee policy. Such a situation, also driven by the fact that the consequences of the

¹⁴ Unlike the standard procedure, the application was free of charge, and the Italian police (*Questura*) were required to release these permits to implement specific urgent procedures. Moreover, the ENA temporary protection did not preclude subsequent requests for refugee status.

¹⁵ At first, with the Decree of April 5, 2011, temporary residence permits were granted for six months. On both October 6, 2011 and May 15, 2012, the duration of these permits was extended until November 21, 2012. Finally, the Decree of February 28, 2013 set rules for the end of the temporary humanitarian protection: foreign citizens who had benefited from these measures could apply for either an assisted voluntary return program or the conversion of their residence permits into other types of residence permits (e.g., work, study, family, etc.).

¹⁶ A large number of the asylum seekers who arrived in 2011 were citizens of other countries, but had lived and worked in Libya for many years. Although they were fleeing persecution that targeted them during the Libyan civil war, the Italian government initially chose not to extend any specific measure of general and/or temporary protection to these refugees. An official Document by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (*Documento di indirizzo per il superamento dell'emergenza Nord Africa*, October 30, 2012) lately recognized that this problem could lead to a "potentially explosive situation," as most of the applications for international protection made by the "Libyan escapees" had initially been rejected. Although this document did not automatically grant a status of humanitarian protection, it was clear from its contents that the government implicitly conceived a solution by inviting these refugees to demand a re-examination of their applications (cf. *Associazione Giuridica per gli Studi sull'Immigrazione*, http://www.asgi.it/home_asgi.php?n=2441&l=it). Notably, on October 30, 2012, the Ministry of the Interior instructed the territorial Commissions to consider the need for humanitarian protection with respect to the persistent situation of hardship in Libya when deciding a case for re-examination. However, this solution was considered a tardy measure, and potential applicants were not supported by a comprehensive set of information (cf. *Casa della Carità*, <http://www.casadellacarita.org/emergenza-nord-africa-permesso>).

¹⁷ For example, according to the Decree of April 5, 2011, foreign citizens who had fled to Italy in the relevant period and had already obtained, requested, or been refused another type of residence permit could apply for temporary ENA protection. For this reason, it is possible that the special protection was requested and obtained also by migrants who were not entitled to it.

¹⁸ In most cases, African migrants arrive in Italy by boat. They often face shipwrecks, with the consequent loss of their documents and belongings. For this and other similar reasons, it is often not easy to determine an individual's true nationality.

emergency were still unpredictable at that time, may also have affected the position of migrants who were interested in regularizing their legal status through nonemergency (both refugee and ordinary) procedures.

On one hand, some migrants – especially those entitled to the ENA benefits – may have benefited from the (temporary) relaxation of the procedures to obtain a refugee residence permit. On the other hand, other migrants – namely, both migrants and refugees not benefiting from the ENA – might have suffered a sort of displacement on account of the enactment of the emergency rules.

3. Data

The data used in this study refer to the period January 1, 2010 - March 31, 2014, and were collected and coded by the authors using information gathered by personnel at CdC. During the period of observation, 938 people were provided with legal assistance. As most of the individuals who come into contact with CdC are not Italian citizens (cf. Table 1), a considerable proportion of CdC's charitable legal-advice activities concerns applications for a residence permit and other problems related to immigration.

In accordance with the scope of our study, we focus on the subset represented by migrants who asked for legal advice concerning application or renewal procedures for a residence permit (881 cases, 94% of the initial sample). All applicants are foreigners. Nationality is always known when the migrant asks advice regarding his/her own residence permit (96.2 % of the sample), except when Italian citizens require legal advice for non-Italian relatives, friends and neighbors. In these cases (3.8 % of the sample) we do not have information regarding the nationality of the immigrants for whom legal advice is required, and are therefore classified in the category "other countries" in Table 1.

TABLE 1 here

The data show that 54% of the applications included in the analysis have been successful (*obtain RP*), namely they first-time applicants have obtained a residence permit (55 % of the sample) or its renewal (45 % of the sample).

It is worth noticing (Table 3) that the ENA regime and other provisions implemented within the context of the crisis improved the rate of success for NAH migrants from 40 % to 71 % and, more generally, for all African citizens (from 45 % to 63 %, Table 4) who had applied for a residence permit.¹⁹

TABLE 2 here

¹⁹ Two different data specifications referring to the rate of success are provided: one corresponds to NAH migrants only, while in the second all African migrants are considered. These two definitions of the migrants who benefitted from the ENA provisions reflect the alternative definitions of the treated groups used in the empirical analysis.

Notably, the emergency regime seems to have impacted also non-African migrants, even though the relevant provisions did not apply to them. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, there was a substantial decrease in the rate of application success among other migrants, following ENA enactment. In this case, one could guess that with the massive influx of newly arrived migrants from Africa, the system somehow “seized up” thus deteriorating and maybe sacrificing the positions of the other migrants. The empirical analysis conducted in the next section is aimed at investigating this phenomenon more in depth.

Obviously, the rate of success in obtaining a residence permit may depend on several factors including, for instance, specific features of the applicant (e.g., labor skills, family conditions, and socioeconomic situations) and the quality and effort of legal advice provided by CdC. We collected detailed information regarding the personal traits of the migrants which may effectively grasp some important elements affecting the probability of success of their applications.

In details, as it emerges from Table 2, migrants’ average birth date (*birth*) was April, 1981, which corresponds to age 29 at the initial time of the survey (i.e., when legal advice has been required), and only 15 % of them were female (*gender*). Factors such as age and gender are important for the empirical analysis because it is well recognized that younger individuals and females (often mothers with children) are more likely to be welcomed in a foreign country, especially for humanitarian reasons. Furthermore, 46 % of the applicants were not established in a house (*dwelling*) at the moment of the survey. This information is relevant to our purposes since is reasonable to expect that those who have settled in a dwelling are also better included in the social context and might therefore find easier to get a residence permit. In relation to this, we also have information about the number of children living in Italy at the time of the survey (*children_nr_it*), which was between 3 and 4.

Other features may ease the probability of being granted a residence permit. We know, for example, that 27% of migrants were in Italy with his/her spouse (*spouse_it*) and 27 % of them were working (*work*), which are two aspects that should also imply higher odds of success for family reasons. In addition, basing on self-declarations to the operators at the time of the request for legal advice, we constructed a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the applicant explicitly declared he/she aimed at asking a residence permit to join his/her relatives who have previously established in Italy (*permit for family reunification*). Finally, fixed-effects corresponding to the operators of CdC assisting the applicants, as well as a dummy variable corresponding to renewal procedures (*permit renewal*) are accounted for.

TABLE 3 here

TABLE 4 here

4. Empirical analysis

The ENA provisions of April 5, 2011 can be viewed as a natural experiment, since the decree *automatically* granted to NAH migrants who had fled to Italy in the relevant period (January 1 - April 5, 2011) a temporary residence permit for humanitarian reasons.

To take advantage of this experimental opportunity, we run DID regressions to estimate the effects of the ENA provisions on the probability of obtaining (or renewing) a residence permit.

We estimate the following equation:

$$E[obtainRP_i | eligible_i, time_i, \mathbf{x}_i] = F(\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 break_i + \alpha_2 eligible_i + \alpha_3 eligible_i * time_i + \mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\alpha}_4) \quad (1)$$

where *obtainRP* indicates whether a residence permit was accorded. The binary variable *break* takes the value 1 from the date in which the ENA provisions were enacted (January 1–April 5, 2011); *eligible* equals 1 when the migrant, being a citizen of a country in North Africa or the Horn of Africa arrived in Italy in the period between January 1 and April 5, 2011, was entitled to benefit from the special treatment.²⁰

More specifically, in order to account for the fact that the ENA provisions were accorded to migrants from North African countries (and soon afterwards to people from the Horn), while the status of refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa was defined only later, we consider two possible definitions of the treatment dummy. The first one includes only North African citizens and people from the Horn and neighboring countries, as mentioned in the Presidential Decree of August 3, 2011 (*eligibleNAH*), while the second one includes all African citizens (*eligibleA*) who fled to Italy in the January 1 to April 5, 2011 period.²¹

\mathbf{x}_i is a vector of covariates described in the previous section, including date of birth, gender, education, marital status, number of children and working conditions. Variables regarding the type of permit (*permit renewal* and *permit for family reunification*), operators, and country-of-origin fixed effects are also included. Finally, $F(\cdot)$ is a logistic cumulative distribution function.

As for the parameters in Equation (1), α_0 and α_1 provide important information regarding the effect of the ENA provisions on the control group, before and after the treatment, respectively. Correspondingly, α_2 and α_3 indicate the impact of the provisions on ENA-eligible migrants, before and after the treatment, respectively. Finally, $\boldsymbol{\alpha}_4$ is a $(m \times 1)$ vector of parameters associated with the covariates.

²⁰ Notice that this refers to an intention to treat (ITT) because ENA-eligible migrants could either apply for asylum or for other (“ordinary”) types of permits.

²¹ As noted before, a large number of the asylum-seekers that fled to Italy in 2011 were citizens of other African countries who had lived and worked in Libya for many years. The status of these refugees remained undetermined for a long time, as it was only on October 30, 2012 that the government defined their situation: although the “Libyan escapees” were not explicitly granted humanitarian protection, they were “invited” to apply for a re-examination of their case.

TABLE 5 here

TABLE 6 here

Table 5 reports the Logit estimates of Equation (1) when the treated group contains only NAH migrants. Table 6, instead, shows the regression outcome when all African citizens are included in the treated group.²²

In addition, in columns (a)–(f) of each table, we report the estimates obtained for six different specifications of Equation (1), which correspond to the progressive inclusion of different types of fixed effects. The first specification (column (a)) has a baseline DID structure, where all covariates and fixed effects are omitted. In the second specification (column (b)), we include the covariates, while in column (c) operator fixed-effects are also added. Different sets of regional and country of origin dummies are introduced in columns (d) to (f).

In general, the results show that the interaction term *eligible*break*, which is associated with the effect of the ENA provisions on the treated group of ENA-eligible applicants, is always positive and significant, suggesting that the latter group of migrants actually benefitted from the emergency provisions. In the specific, estimates in the most complete specification of (1) reported in Table 5 (column (f)) indicate that the estimated rate of success for the group of NAH migrants became 58% during the period in which migrants could apply for the ENA benefits, while being 28.4% in “normal” times. On the contrary, the success rate of the control group dropped from 45% to 23.2% during the ENA period. Overall, the treatment effect for NAH migrants corresponds to 51.4%.

There is also some evidence in favor of the fact that before April 5, 2011 the treated group of NAH migrants received less favorable treatment, since the parameters related to *eligibleNAH* (Table 5) are often negative and significant. The parameter associated to *eligibleA* (Table 6) suggests that the odds of success of all African migrants’ applications has increased as a consequence of the introduction of the ENA provisions, although this effect looks weaker than that on NAH migrants.

However, in line with the descriptive statistics illustrated in the previous section (Tables 3 and 4), estimates are likely to indicate that the probability of obtaining a residence permit dramatically decreased for the control group of migrants following the application of the ENA provisions. This is inferred from the parameter associated with *break*, which is negative and significant in all estimates in Tables 5 and 6. However, before further commenting on this result, some discussion related to the presence of possible disturbing factors is worthwhile.

Regarding the possibility of self-selection into the group of ENA-eligible migrants, we can reasonably exclude the possibility that the ENA enactment may have itself caused changes in the definition of the

²² We also performed estimations where the treated group included only citizens of North African countries (i.e., excluding those coming from the Horn of Africa and from Sub-Saharan Africa). We did not obtain substantially different results.

treated/control groups at the aggregate (i.e., national) level. In fact, as aforementioned, the ENA rules have been designed in such a way that migrants could not take advantage of these provisions, once they had knowledge of their existence. It is not coincidence, indeed, that the enactment date was April 5, whereas the relevant time of arrival in Italy required for eligibility was January 1 – April 5, 2011. As a consequence, in spite of the fact that the ENA enactment has increased the number of African immigrants, it should not have, *per se*, generated an additional influx of migrants from countries subject to the emergency, with the aim of exploiting these special provisions. Moreover, it is worth noting that since the ENA residence permits have mostly been granted according to verifiable characteristics (i.e., nationality and time of arrival in Italy), the probability of success should not, in principle, have been affected by the individual-level and unmeasurable traits of the migrant.

Still, however, some migrants could have applied for a residence permit for humanitarian reasons (mostly under the ENA) on the basis of individual-level perceptions regarding the possibility of success, perhaps driven by the euphoria generated by this exceptional situation, and otherwise, in the absence of the ENA provisions, they would have applied for ordinary permits. Personal traits might thus have increased the share of applications for humanitarian reasons but not the characteristics of the treated group in our sample, which is defined according to *eligibility* for the ENA benefits. In fact, entitlement is based on objective elements which cannot be altered as a consequence of the ENA enactment, and which were not known by the applicants at the moment of their arrival in Italy. For instance, it is reasonable to suppose that some migrants that flew to Italy after April 5, 2011 claimed to have arrived in the period January 1 – April 5, 2011, or that migrants not endowed with documents claim to belong to (or have been temporarily working) in North Africa or the Horn. Although this practice might have occurred in front of the Authorities with the aim to take advantage of the ENA provisions (which is one of the theses stemming from the regression output discussed in the next section) migrants had no valid reason to cheat to CdC's operators regarding their origins or the true date of arrival. In fact, the latter are actually used to assign migrants to either the treated or control groups, regardless what they report to the Authorities or the type of permit they apply for.

Finally, there is additional noteworthy evidence suggested by our estimates. On the one hand, parameters associated with the covariates show that being younger, female, and having a spouse in Italy increases the probability of being accorded a permit. This is generally justified by the fact that socially weaker individuals tend to receive more protection. On the other hand, having regular work does not seem to substantially help obtaining a residence permit (the parameter associated to *work* is never significant although showing the expected positive sign). Such an outcome suggests that, in spite of the illiberal rhetoric regarding the control of immigration and which characterized political actions in Italy during the tenure of the center-right government (Geddes 2008), residence permits have been more easily obtained through a protection rationale than in line with the idea of guaranteeing regular legal status to migrant workers. Finally, it is worth observing that country-of-origin dummies have a substantial role in explaining the variance of the dependent variable, as clearly shown by the pseudo-R² at the bottom of Tables 5 and 6.

4.1 Multilevel Analysis

In the previous sub-section we found that the parameter associated with the ENA legislation enactment (*break*) is negative and significant when estimates are conducted through a DID model. This led us to infer that an undesirable decreasing effect of the success rate for the control group of migrants (who did not qualify for obtaining a residence permit basing on the ENA decree) has occurred. Whether this effect has been the result of the ENA provisions or reflected a general downward trend in the release of residence permits remains a questionable point. In the former case, in fact, problems with the DID methodology may arise due to the fact that the treatment was likely to affect also the control group of migrants, which violates the basic model assumptions.

The latter situation is also challenging in that it may add difficulties due to serially correlated error terms in (1). For instance, according to the literature (see for example Bertrand et al., 2003), biased standard errors of the estimated effects of the ENA provisions may occur as an effect of disregarding serial correlation. One of the suggested remedies in face of this possibility is the inclusion of a time trend in the DID specification. This strategy has been adopted in the analysis conducted in the previous section, where the variable *date legal advice* has been included, but without obtaining substantial changes in the significance level of the variable *break* compared to estimates obtained out without this covariate.²³ However, introducing a time trend is considered a rather loose method for excluding the presence of a general downward trend in the permit accordancy rate (see again Bertrand et al., 2003). Moreover, in our specific case, a larger control group – which might have suffered an increase of the permit denial rate as a direct consequence of the ENA enactment – may have driven both the sign and significance of the parameter associated to the variable *date legal advice* even without the presence of a negative time trend in the overall sample. This would send us back to the situation of violation of the DID assumptions described before.

In this sub-section we aim at addressing this and other related facts which may in principle bias the estimates obtained by means of the DID methodology. We propose a non-parametric multilevel model which can be considered more flexible than DID for at least three reasons. First, it accounts for the possible more articulated structure of the variance-covariance matrix of the errors, which may help accommodating serial correlation. Second, contrary to DID, it helps escaping the problem of inflated estimates of the average effect of the ENA enactment for the category of eligible migrants.²⁴ Third, besides avoiding restrictive assumptions on the distribution of the error term of the estimated equation, non-parametric techniques are particularly appropriate in a situation when treated and control groups are unbalanced.

Our data is set at the individual migrant level (lower level, i) while being nested within the ENA eligibility level (higher level, j), as defined in the previous sub section. We estimate an individual level equation as follows:

²³ Available upon request.

²⁴ The DID model has problems similar to those discussed for a complete-pooling (Fixed-Effects) regression. In our specific case it would overfit the data giving implausibly high estimates for the – smaller – group of migrants entitled to the ENA treatment (see for example Gelman, 2012).

$$obtainRP_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}break_{ij} + \mathbf{x}'_{ij}\boldsymbol{\beta}_2 + r_{ij} \quad (2)$$

where $obtainRP_{ij}$ and \mathbf{x}'_{ij} have the same meaning as in (1), referring to the rate of success for the individual migrant and lower level predictors, respectively; $\boldsymbol{\beta}_2$ is a vector of regression coefficients for lower level predictors; and r_{ij} is an independent error term at the lower level. In addition, as specific to multilevel models, β_{0j} is the intercept in group j , where groups are represented by migrants entitled to the ENA benefits, on the one hand and non-eligible migrants, on the other hand. Finally, β_{1j} is the slope of group j 's predictor ($break$) and the dependent variable $obtainRP_{ij}$.

We model β_{0j} as follows:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}u_j + \eta_{0j}$$

where γ_{00} is the overall regression intercept, or grand mean; u_j represents the binary predictor at the higher level categorizing treated and non-treated groups, and η_{0j} is an independent random error term at the higher level.

We also assume that β_{1j} has the following structure:

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10}u_j + \eta_{1j}$$

where γ_{10} is the specific regression coefficient of $break$; γ_{10} is the group slope, and η_{1j} refers to the random error component of the slope associated to lower level predictors.

Given a relatively small treated sample and a reduced number of groups (treated and non-treated migrants) we fit a non-parametric Hierarchical Binomial Linear Regression Model (Gelman et al., 2003; Gelman and Hill, 2006). In details, we assume multivariate Normal priors for the fixed-coefficients ($\boldsymbol{\beta}_2$) and an Inverse-Wishart prior for the random coefficient variance matrix ($V(\beta_{1j})$). We also assume that r_{ij} is normally distributed with zero-mean and use an Inverse-Gamma prior for modelling over-dispersion in its variance-covariance matrix.

The model is run using the Markow Chain Monte Carlo methodology for 10,000 iterations, discarding the first 2,000 as burn-in and using a thinning interval of 10. The blocked Gibbs sampler 2 of Chib and Carlin (1999) is adopted. Results are reported in Tables 7 and 8.

As shown by the estimated parameters of $slope(break)eligibleNAH$ and $slope(break)control$, which are both significant and, respectively, positive and negative, estimates in Tables 7 and 8 confirm that there has been an expected increase of the success rate of permit accordance for the group of migrants entitled to ENA, whereas a somehow unexpected adverse increase of permit denial has occurred to other migrants. This pattern occurs as an additional effect besides the general decrease of permit release, the latter resulting from the negative and significant parameter associated to the time trend ($date\ legal\ advice$), suggesting that the DID method was not fully suitable to estimate the direct effect of the ENA rules on the treated group of migrants.

Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the intercept parameters of treated and non-treated African migrants in columns (d)-(i) of Table 8 (*intercept.eligibleA*, *intercept.control*) are significant and, respectively, negative and positive. According to the descriptive statistics in Table 4, this tends to confirm that African migrants, regardless of whether they came from North Africa or the rest of the continent, were initially more disadvantaged in terms of permit accordancy compared to the control group. There is instead no significant evidence for North African migrants and migrants from the Horn taken individually (Table 7), although reported parameter signs are in line with the descriptive statistics in Table 3.

Finally, there is some additional evidence from the regression output in tables 7 and 8 compared to DID estimates. An interesting result is that the variables *children_nr_it* and *permit for family reunification*, preserve the same sign as in tables 5 and 6, but now become significant. Although such outcomes may seem somehow weird, our impression is that these variables are capturing other effects which are worth investigating more in depth. All the other estimated parameters reflect the same evidence commented in the previous sub-section.

TABLE 7 here

TABLE 8 here

5. Discussion and conclusions

In this study, we used an original dataset containing micro-level data that were collected at CdC, an important charity in Milan, to estimate the effects of the North Africa Emergency rules (ENA). The ENA regime was implemented in 2011 by the Italian government to manage the exceptional flow of migrants escaping African crises, and we wished to assess how its enactment affected the probability of migrants being accorded a residence permit.

Results indicate that for the treated group of migrants – where the entitlement to treatment has been defined according to nationality and time of arrival in Italy – there was a significant increase in the probability of obtaining a residence permit following the enactment of the ENA rules. This finding was somehow expected, and it supports the idea that the Italian government was effective in recognizing a special status of protection for people who have escaped African countries under a state of emergency in 2011. However, we also noted that the ENA provisions adversely affected the condition of migrants in the control group, as their probability of being accorded a residence permit dramatically decreased following the ENA enactment.

Although the data do not allow for further investigation of the potential reasons for this unexpected displacement effect, at least three non-mutually exclusive drivers can be conjectured: (i) erroneous shifting from ordinary applications to ENA applications, (ii) system congestion, and (iii) rationing against ordinary applicants.

(i) The first possible explanation for the displacement effect may be identified as an unwanted shifting from ordinary procedures to the ENA procedure: some non-eligible migrants belonging to the control group might unsuccessfully have tried to apply for the ENA regime or for any another form of international or humanitarian protection. This could be due either to an attempt to strategically exploit the relaxation of rules implied by the emergency provisions, or to a misinterpretation of the nature of the ENA.²⁵ From this viewpoint, possible policy implications would be to provide better information through public authorities, and to cultivate a more prudential attitude among legal advisors in terms of orienting applicants.

(ii) Another possible explanation for the observed displacement effect may simply relate to the difficulties associated with handling the crisis: the massive influx of newly arrived migrants from Africa might have somehow “jammed” the entire administrative system, thus deteriorating the position of non-African migrants. Arguably, this congestion may be – at least in part – due to the aforementioned shifting effect from ordinary procedures to the ENA regime. Therefore, the ENA rules might have had an adverse effect on the functioning of the already-overloaded authorities who evaluate migrant applications. The congestion hypothesis seems to be consistent with several *ex post* considerations made by the Italian government vis-à-vis the ENA regime.²⁶ Thus, further research should feature a more in-depth examination of the distinction between applicants for “ordinary” residence permits (for working, studying, and family reasons) and permits that provide international or humanitarian protection. In this sense, it should be expected that this peculiar adverse effect had a greater impact on the latter category of applicants, at the expense of other migrants who required other types of residence permits.

(iii) Finally, a third driver of displacement may have been the implementation of a (more or less) tacit policy by public authorities, which may have aimed to ration or, at least, restrain the number of residence permits accorded each year. Although the Italian government does not explicitly make use of quotas with regard to requests for international or humanitarian protection, there is the possibility that the increase in the number of residence permits accorded to African migrants – due to the ENA enactment – was counterbalanced by a stricter attitude toward other migrants. Further research is required, to shed light on these possible explanations.

²⁵ For instance, our dataset includes nine migrants from the Indian subcontinent who explicitly applied for the ENA protection, as they likely expected to be considered as “Libyan escapees.”

²⁶ See, for instance, the Document released by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers on October 30, 2012 (*Documento di indirizzo per il superamento dell'emergenza Nord Africa*). This document, which aimed to instruct territorial authorities who faced the emergency, recognized that the increase in the number of asylum seekers could generate a “potentially explosive situation” and also protracted the time needed to complete application procedures for a residence permit.

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European Legislation:

- Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted;
- Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status.

Italian Legislation:

- Legislative Decree (D.lgs.) No. 286 of 25 July 1998 (Consolidated Act on Immigration Laws);
- Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, April 5th, 2011, North Africa Emergency, temporary measures of humanitarian protection for citizens of North African countries;

Table 1: People provided with legal assistance (Jan. 2010 – Mar. 2014), by place of origin.

Region	Overall sample		Legal assistance for residence permit	
	Nr.	% of total	Nr.	% of total
North Africa	211	22.49	203	23.04
Horn of Africa	146	15.57	145	16.46
Sub-Saharan Africa	377	40.19	370	42.00
Indian Subcontinent	41	4.37	39	4.43
Middle East	42	4.48	37	4.20
East Asia	11	1.17	9	1.02
Latin America	21	2.24	2	0.23
Eastern Europe	2	0.21	2	0.23
Other countries ⁽¹⁾	87	9.28	74	8.40
Total	938	100	881	100

⁽¹⁾ Including Italian citizens requiring legal advice for non-Italian relatives, friends and neighbors.

Table 2: Summary statistics and variable definitions.

Variable	Definition	Mean	Mean Tr. NAH	Mean Cont. NAH	t test equal mean	Mean Tr. A	Mean Cont. A	t test equal mean
<i>obtain RP</i>	1 if permit is obtained	0.54	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed
<i>birth</i> ⁽¹⁾	birth date	29704 (3712) [11967; 34768]	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed
<i>gender</i>	1 if female	0.15	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed
<i>dwelling</i>	0 if homeless	0.46	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed
<i>spouse_it</i>	1 if partner in Italy	0.27	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed
<i>children_nr_it</i>	nr. of children living in Italy	3.38 (1.81) [0; 7]	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed
<i>work</i>	1 if regular worker	0.27	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed
<i>permit renewal</i>	1 if renewal	0.45	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed
<i>permit for family reunification</i>	1 if the migrant declares that he/she intends to apply for family reunification	0.03	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed	To be completed

Number of observations: 938. Std. dev. In parenthesis. Min and Max in square brackets.

⁽¹⁾ Day number 1 corresponds to January 1, 1900.

Table 3: *Rate of success for NAH applying for a residence permit (Jan. 2010 – Mar. 2014).*

	% of success of migrants from North Africa and Horn (NAH)		% of success control group	
	Mean	Growth rate (no emergency=> ENA)	Mean	Growth rate (no emergency=> ENA)
No emergency January 1, 2010 - April 5, 2011 and November 21, 2012 -March 31, 2014	40% (25 obs.)		67% (630 obs.)	
During ENA April 5, 2011- November 21, 2012	71% (17 obs.)	78%	58% (209 obs.)	-13%

Data refer to migrants who applied for a residence permit.

Table 4: *Rate of success for A applying for a residence permit (Jan. 2010 – Mar. 2014).*

	% of success of migrants from Africa (A)		% of success control group	
	Mean	Growth rate (no emergency=> ENA)	Mean	Growth rate (no emergency=> ENA)
No emergency January 1, 2010 - April 5, 2011 and November 21, 2012 -March 31, 2014	45% (35 obs.)		57% (620 obs.)	
During ENA April 5, 2011- November 21, 2012	63% (19 obs.)	40%	46% (207 obs.)	-19%

Data refer to migrants who applied for a residence permit.

Table 5. ENA effects on success rate of applicants for a residence permit. Logit estimates. Treated group: citizens from North Africa, Horn of Africa, and neighboring countries who entered Italy between January 1 and April 5, 2011.

Variable	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
<i>break</i>	-0.107 (0.072)	-0.157** (0.077)	-0.228** (0.110)	-0.231** (0.104)	-0.236** (0.104)	-0.218** (0.102)
<i>eligibleNAH</i>	-0.172** (0.085)	-0.178** (0.075)	-0.265*** (0.092)	-0.075 (0.082)	-0.074 (0.083)	-0.166* (0.094)
<i>eligibleNAH*break</i>	0.425*** (0.106)	0.442*** (0.100)	0.493*** (0.130)	0.510*** (0.113)	0.515*** (0.112)	0.514*** (0.105)
<i>birth</i>		0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
<i>spouse_it</i>		0.254** (0.110)	0.336* (0.172)	0.360** (0.159)	0.372** (0.153)	0.431** (0.211)
<i>gender</i>		0.094 (0.067)	0.191** (0.082)	0.102 (0.073)	0.107 (0.076)	0.144* (0.080)
<i>dwelling</i>		-0.116* (0.061)	-0.047 (0.051)	-0.014 (0.058)	-0.012 (0.059)	0.057 (0.069)
<i>work</i>		0.058 (0.064)	0.005 (0.094)	0.020 (0.087)	0.026 (0.091)	-0.012 (0.096)
<i>children_nr_it</i>		-0.113 (0.109)	-0.174 (0.175)	-0.180 (0.158)	-0.160 (0.165)	-0.124 (0.218)
<i>permit for family reunification</i>		-0.172 (0.158)	-0.185 (0.161)	-0.306* (0.158)	-0.260 (0.177)	-0.172 (0.158)
<i>permit renewal</i>			0.557** (0.218)	0.642*** (0.175)	0.578*** (0.212)	0.553*** (0.212)
<i>date legal advice</i>			-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.071 (0.060)	0.225 (0.209)	0.247 (0.281)	0.156 (0.266)	0.152 (0.306)	0.450 (0.346)
Region Fixed-effects: North Africa, Horn of Africa	no	no	no	yes	yes	no
Region Fixed-effects: Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, Latin America, Middle East, Indian Subcontinent, Eastern Europe.	no	no	no	no	yes	no
Country-of-origin Fixed-effects	no	no	no	no	no	yes
Operator Fixed-effects	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Pseudo-R2	0.0992	0.1391	0.2676	0.2989	0.3004	0.3741

Dependent variable is *obtainRP* = 1 if a residence permit has been obtained.

Marginal effects are reported. Std. Err. clustered at the nation of origin level in parenthesis.

⁽¹⁾Day number 1 corresponds to January 1, 1900.

Observations: 881. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6. ENA effects on success rate of applicants for a residence permit. Logit estimates. Treated group: all African citizens who entered Italy between January 1 and April 5, 2011.

Variable	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
<i>break</i>	-0.102 (0.071)	-0.151** (0.077)	-0.224** (0.110)	-0.230** (0.103)	-0.233** (0.104)	-0.215** (0.102)
<i>eligibleA</i>	-0.114 (0.075)	-0.127 (0.079)	-0.188* (0.108)	-0.078 (0.072)	-0.078 (0.073)	-0.128 (0.091)
<i>eligibleA*break</i>	0.278** (0.127)	0.298** (0.143)	0.353* (0.194)	0.401** (0.167)	0.403** (0.168)	0.399** (0.161)
<i>birth</i>		0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
<i>spouse_it</i>		0.257** (0.111)	0.338** (0.172)	0.367** (0.158)	0.372** (0.153)	0.430** (0.211)
<i>gender</i>		0.095 (0.068)	0.194** (0.083)	0.109 (0.076)	0.110 (0.076)	0.147* (0.081)
<i>dwelling</i>		-0.115* (0.061)	-0.046 (0.051)	-0.012 (0.059)	-0.012 (0.058)	0.059 (0.068)
<i>work</i>		0.059 (0.064)	0.002 (0.092)	0.026 (0.089)	0.029 (0.091)	-0.013 (0.095)
<i>children_nr_it</i>		-0.115 (0.109)	-0.176 (0.175)	-0.176 (0.162)	-0.162 (0.164)	-0.125 (0.218)
<i>permit for family reunification</i>	-0.257 (0.177)	-0.173 (0.158)	-0.182 (0.159)	-0.296* (0.157)	-0.257 (0.177)	-0.173 (0.158)
<i>permit renewal</i>	0.576*** (0.213)		0.554** (0.219)	0.642*** (0.175)	0.576*** (0.213)	0.554** (0.216)
<i>date legal advice</i> ⁽¹⁾	-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.071 (0.061)	0.226 (0.209)	0.246 (0.281)	0.164 (0.273)	0.150 (0.307)	0.441 (0.344)
Region Fixed-effects: North Africa, Horn of Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa	no	no	no	yes	yes	no
Region Fixed-effects: East Asia, Latin America, Middle East, Indian Subcontinent, Eastern Europe.	no	no	no	no	yes	no
Country-of-origin Fixed-effects	no	no	no	no	no	yes
Operator Fixed-effects	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Pseudo-R2	0.0968	0.1367	0.2659	0.2969	0.2981	0.3725

Dependent variable is *obtainRP* = 1 if a residence permit has been obtained.

Marginal effects are reported. Std. Err. clustered at the nation of origin level in parenthesis.

⁽¹⁾ Day number 1 corresponds to January 1, 1900.

Observations: 881. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7. ENA effects on success rate of applicants for a residence permit. multilevel estimates. Treated group: citizens from North Africa, Horn of Africa, and neighboring countries who entered Italy between January 1 and April 5, 2011.

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
	Mean	SD	Mean /SD	Mean	SD	Mean /SD	Mean	SD	Mean /SD
<i>intercept.eligibleNAH</i>	-0.028	0.055	0.500	-0.021	0.031	0.674	-0.033	0.025	1.295
<i>intercept.control</i>	0.016	0.034	0.471	0.047	0.038	1.228	0.048	0.031	1.526
<i>slope(break) eligible-NAH</i>	0.478	0.060	7.955	0.335	0.051	6.565	0.312	0.054	5.729
<i>slope(break) control</i>	-0.267	0.021	12.47	-0.477	0.077	6.158	-0.491	0.034	14.53
<i>date legal advice⁽¹⁾</i>	-0.481	0.45	-1.068	-0.856	0.25	-3.424	-0.489	0.281	4
<i>birth⁽¹⁾</i>	0.359	0.030	12.13	0.663	0.056	11.87	0.764	0.024	31.66
<i>spouse_it</i>	0.513	0.036	14.28	0.646	0.060	10.71	0.432	0.072	5
<i>gender</i>	0.425	0.050	8.564	0.450	0.027	16.69	0.310	0.034	46.89
<i>dwelling</i>	-0.506	0.018	27.40	-0.488	0.010	46.89	-0.144	0.022	7
<i>work</i>	0.371	0.024	15.60	0.524	0.028	18.87	0.216	0.021	10.47
<i>children_nr_it</i>	-0.342	0.042	8.146	-0.423	0.073	5.786	-0.320	0.056	5
<i>permit for family reunification</i>				-0.611	0.041	14.96			6
<i>permit renewal</i>				0.207	0.049	4.257			
Constant	-0.751	1.792	0.419	-1.049	0.893	1.175	4.164	1.135	3.669
Operator Fixed-effects	yes			yes			yes		
Region Fixed-effects:	no			no			yes		
Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, Latin America, Middle East, Indian Subcontinent, Eastern Europe.									

Dependent variable is *obtainRP* = 1 if a residence permit has been obtained.

Marginal effects are reported. ⁽¹⁾Parameters multiplied by 10000. Observations: 881. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8. ENA effects on success rate of applicants for a residence permit. multilevel estimates. Treated group: all African citizens who entered Italy between January 1 and April 5, 2011.

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
	Mean	SD	Mean /SD	Mean	SD	Mean /SD	Mean	SD	Mean /SD
<i>intercept.eligibleA</i>	-0.015	0.027	0.555	-0.096	0.049	1.934	-0.085	0.051	1.664
<i>intercept.control</i>	0.026	0.035	0.756	0.149	0.066	2.252	0.218	0.077	2.837
<i>slope(break) eligibleA</i>	0.198	0.044	4.458	0.168	0.072	2.320	0.108	0.079	1.379
<i>slope(break) control</i>	-0.382	0.025	15.42	-0.272	0.029	9.518	-0.317	0.036	8.710
<i>date legal advice⁽¹⁾</i>	-0.012	0.350	0.035	-0.933	0.426	-2.190	-0.962	0.514	-1.871
<i>birth⁽¹⁾</i>	0.627	0.023	27.73	0.706	0.035	20.33	0.693	0.045	15.40
<i>spouse_it</i>	0.311	0.039	0	0.122	0.103	1	0.660	0.033	5
<i>gender</i>	0.040	0.039	7.971	0.251	0.079	1.192	0.499	0.027	19.75
<i>dwelling</i>	-0.382	0.018	21.56	-0.301	0.012	24.70	-0.286	0.026	18.74
<i>work</i>	0.415	0.034	12.09	-0.294	0.079	1	0.573	0.032	11.05
<i>children_nr_it</i>	-0.208	0.035	8	-0.664	0.085	3.713	-0.586	0.047	17.90
<i>permit for family reunification</i>			5.940	-0.859	0.088	7.821			4
<i>permit renewal</i>				0.220	0.017	12.77			12.43
Constant	-1.298	1.398	0.928	5.871	1.807	3.249	6.528	2.217	2.945
Operator Fixed-effects	yes			yes			yes		
Region Fixed-effects: East Asia, Latin America, Middle East, Indian Subcontinent, Eastern Europe.	no			no			yes		

Dependent variable is *obtainRP* = 1 if a residence permit has been obtained.

Marginal effects are reported. ⁽¹⁾ Parameters multiplied by 10000

Observations: 881. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.