Benefits of Contractual Linkages
Faculty of Economics and Business (M-building, room: M0.02). Title: "Benefits of Contractual Linkages". Doors open from 11.45, lunch will be served.
Date | 31 March 2014 |
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Time | 12:00 -13:15 |
Location | Roeterseilandcampus - gebouw M |
Room | Faculty of Economics and Business (REC M) - Room M0.02 |
In this paper, I examine the question of whether decentralized, private contracting can emulate centralized, multilateral contracting. I show that success of the decentralized system requires the parties in different contractual relationships to establish at least implicit links between their contracts. I examine various ways in which these contract linkages may be formed, focusing on three main institutional settings that are defined on the basis of the set of feasible contracts: (i) general contracts on contracts, (ii) a separable form of contracting on contracts, and (iii) contracts on only productive actions.