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Faculty of Economics and Business (M-building, room: M0.02). Title: "Benefits of Contractual Linkages". Doors open from 11.45, lunch will be served.

Detail Summary
Date 31 March 2014
Time 12:00 - 13:15
Location Roeterseilandcampus - gebouw M

In this paper, I examine the question of whether decentralized, private contracting can emulate centralized, multilateral contracting. I show that success of the decentralized system requires the parties in different contractual relationships to establish at least implicit links between their contracts. I examine various ways in which these contract linkages may be formed, focusing on three main institutional settings that are defined on the basis of the set of feasible contracts: (i) general contracts on contracts, (ii) a separable form of contracting on contracts, and (iii) contracts on only productive actions.

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Roeterseilandcampus - gebouw M
Roeterseilandcampus - gebouw M

Room Faculty of Economics and Business (REC M) - Room M0.02

Plantage Muidergracht 12
1018 TV Amsterdam