Faculty of Economics and Business (M-Building, room MS.02). Title: "The Dynamics of Mergers among (Ex)Co-Conspirators in The Shadow of Cartel Enforcement (with Leslie Marx - Duke University)". Doors open from 11.45, lunch will be served.
We investigate cartelists' merger behavior using the complete set of European Commission (EC) cartel decisions over a 28-year span and information on cartelists' merger activities over the last 30 years. We find that mergers occur frequently. But they cluster in a few particular industries and usually included only a minority of the cartel participants. We find that the EC's leniency programs expedite merger. Voluntarily ceasing infringement does not affect merger timing; After caught in the act, co-conspirators merge at a substantially greater pace. The results shed light on the design of merger policies and enforcement programs against cartels.