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ACLE Empirical Legal Studies Seminar with Roberto Galbiati (Sciences Po, Paris). Title "Voters' Response to Public Policies: Evidence from a Natural Experiment". The seminar is jointly organized with the CREED. Venue: Faculty of Economics and Business, Room E1.50.

Detail Summary
Date 8 December 2015
Time 16:00 - 17:15
Location Roeterseilandcampus - gebouw E

Abstract:

This paper* analyzes the voters’ response to a public policy by exploiting a natural experiment arising from the 2006 Collective Clemency Bill in Italy. The design of the Bill created idiosyncratic incentives to recidivate across pardoned individuals. Our results show that these individual incentives created different policy effects across municipalities. Cities where the incentives to recidivate of pardoned individuals resident in that municipality were higher, experienced a higher recidivism rate. At the same time, a higher incentive to recidivate at the municipal level lead to: a) newspapers reporting more crime news relative to the pre-pardon period (as well as more crime news involving pardoned individuals); b) voters holding worse beliefs on the incumbent government’s crime control policies. Finally, the incumbent government’s experienced a worse electoral performance in the April 2008 elections relative to the opposition coalition in municipalities where pardoned individuals had a higher incentive to recidivate. Overall, we provide direct empirical evidence showing that voters receive private signals consistent with the effects of public policies. In turn, they use these information to form their posterior beliefs on the quality of the incumbent government’s policies. Ultimately, voters keep the incumbent government accountable by conditioning their vote on their posterior beliefs. 

* Authored by Francesco Drago, Roberto Galbiati, and Francesco Sobbrio

 

Personal Site Roberto Galbiati

Roeterseilandcampus - gebouw E
Roeterseilandcampus - gebouw E

Room Faculty of Economics and Business - REC E - Room E1.50

Roetersstraat 11
1018 WB Amsterdam