Abstract 

A standard model of capital markets contracting argues that issuers select non-price contract terms to optimize their value relative to the price they imagine investors will charge for it. To assess this model’s ability to explain term selection in the syndicated loan market, we study the secondary market reaction to events—the appearance and proliferation of a new type of restructuring transaction known as an uptier—that spurred quick changes in the contract terms that parties negotiated in the primary market. We find only weak (and fragile) evidence of a significant price effect for loans traded on the secondary market. The imprecision of our results reveals a challenge for scholars of contracting who might rely on an event-study research design. The fact that market participants cannot obtain a reliable indication of “price” when there is a substantial shock to the understanding of a meaningful non-price term also casts doubt on the descriptive power of the price-discipline mechanism for all but the most important features of a loan contract.

Paper can be downloaded here.

Practicalities

This event will be a hybrid event. The seminar will take place in Roeterseiland campus (REC) building A, room number A3.15 (Research Seminar Room), and will also be streamed online via Zoom.  

About the speaker 

Adam Badawi is Professor of Law at Berkeley Law. He writes broadly on corporate governance, shareholder litigation, and financial contracting. He taught previously at Washington University in St. Louis Law School and has been a visitor at Columbia Law School, Northwestern Law School, the University of Amsterdam, and the University of Queensland. 

About ACLE

The Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE) is a joint initiative of the Faculty of Economics and Business and the Faculty of Law at the University of Amsterdam. The objective of the ACLE is to promote high-quality interdisciplinary research at the intersection between law and economics.