The ACLE Competition & Regulation meetings (from 2005-2013) consisted of a series of annual workshops that focused on topics in competition law enforcement and regulation. Around a program of key-note speakers, (young) scholars discussed submitted academic papers in parallel sessions. The leading idea was to inform European competition policy. The aim was to attract many specialized participants from academia, government antitrust agencies, law and consulting firms to create the optimal conditions for a high level exchange of views.
The ninth ACLE Competition & Regulation Meeting focused on the weighing of public interests in the assessment of competition cases, in particular the cartel prohibition. Competition authorities are increasingly expected to consider other public interests than just competition in their competition decisions, including quality of the health care system, the environment, and living conditions of farm animals. The Dutch ACM stated to be receptive to cartels arguing the collusive production of public interests in defense of cartel overcharges. Apart from the question whether this Dutch initiative is compatible with EU competition law, how in practice will any gain in public interests be weighed against the anti-competitive effects of a cartel? The discussion on these fundamental issues raised by the Dutch initiative was introduced by Erik Kloosterhuis (ACM), Giorgio Monti (EUI Florence), Gareth Myles (University of Exeter) and Luc Peeperkorn (European Commission).
The eight ACLE Competition & Regulation Meeting focused on what we can learn from behavioral economics for the enforcement of competition law and regulation. Much of traditional competition policy and regulation is based on insights from economic models with rational decision-makers, whereas a substantial body of research shows that many individuals are better characterized as being boundedly rational. The discussion on what behavioral competition and regulation could be was introduced by Botond Köszegi (UC Berkeley) and Maurice E. Stucke (University of Tenessee).
The seventh C&R Meeting, in May 2011, addressed competition enforcement in emerging economies and its interrelationship to economic development. Central was the question whether new enforcement regimes need a special set of enforcement tools and what an appropriate mix of enforcement tools and priorities should be in what stage in the country's economic life-cycle. Contributions were made by: Frédéric Jenny (ESSEC Business School), Daniel Sokol (University of Florida) and Michal Gal (University of Haifa), William Kovacic (FTC), Marc Ivaldi (Toulouse School of Economics) and Hassan Qaqaya (UNCTAD).
The sixth ACLE conference addresses the role of sharing information in the competitiveness of markets. The extent to which market information and commercial business information is available to economic actors affects competition. The availability of information about market circumstances can lead to production efficiencies and enhance transparency for example in the regulated markets. Information disclosure is a crucial remedy to overcome information asymmetry for example in markets for non-homogeneous, complex products such as financial services or telecommunications. The availability of information and the exchange of such information can, on the other hand, also facilitate coordination and collusion.
The fifth C&R Meeting, in March 2009 was a two-day event on To Enforce and Comply: Incentives inside Corporations and Agencies. Focus was on how private incentive schemes of regulators, enforcers and managers of firms determine the outcome of law enforcement. Speakers included Joseph E. Harrington, William E. Kovacic, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Xavier Vives, Jonathan M. Karpoff, Douglas Cumming, William Blumenthal, Bill Bishop, Andrea Appella, Robert Porter, Barry Rodger, Christof Swaak and Martijn Snoep. The event shed new light on the underlying motivation for law makers to design rules and institutions, for civil servants to enforce the law, and the incentives for company managers and investors to comply with such rules. For more information click on the link below.
The fourth C&R Meeting, in April 2008, concerned the topic EC Competition Enforcement Data. In this special edition, a small group of specialists in competition law enforcement and econometrics, including Bruce Lyons, Stephen Davies, Tomaso Duso, Jo Seldeslachts, Klaus Gugler and Martin Carree met to discuss quality of data, sample selection bias issues, and possible hypotheses to bring to the data. For more information click on de link below.
The third C&R Meeting, in March 2007, concerned Strategic Firm-Authority Interaction in Antitrust, Merger Control and Regulation. Key-note addresses by R. Preston McAfee and Stephen Calkins introduced discussion on a variety of economic and legal aspects of the game between regulatory agencies and the firms they control in ten parallel sessions. For more information click on de link below.
The second C&R Meeting, in March 2006 was on Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement. Key-note speakers included Franklin Fisher, Andrew I. Gavil and John Connor. In total eight parallel sessions showed a wide variety of scholarly contributions by scholars from a wide array of backgrounds. A special issue of the Journal of Competition Law and Economics on the topic is forthcoming. For more information click on de link below.
The first C&R Meeting, in February 2005, titled Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy: Economic and Legal Implications of the Tendency to Criminalize Antitrust Enforcement in the EU Member States, was on the trend to criminalize antitrust law in Europe. Key-note speakers included Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, William Kovacic, Eleanor Fox, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Wouter Wils and Bruce Lyons. There were in total eight parallel session meetings. A book with the best efforts of this opening event of the ACLE was recently published by Edward Elgar. For more information click on de link below.