2010-2014, Benjamin van Rooij

Reorienting Global Risk Regulation: Matching Regulatory Instruments and Enforcement Capacity

Risk regulation in emerging markets demands a new approach to regulatory theory. Current theory presupposes a basic level of enforcement and compliance, necessary for the effective functioning of all regulatory instruments. The question remains how effective regulation can be established when enforcement capacity is underdeveloped and disregard for the law is widespread, as is often the case in emerging markets.

Risk regulation in emerging markets therefore requires the study of two key issues:

1. How can the mixture of regulatory instruments and enforcement strategies be adapted to fit relatively low enforcement capacity and compliance levels?
2. How can regulation, by state or non-state actors, help reach a tipping point where regulatory violation is the exception rather than the rule?

This research aims to address these questions and stimulate regulatory theory for emerging markets. It does so through a series of case studies comparing how different types of regulatory instruments and state and non-state enforcement pressures have affected compliance by small and medium-sized enterprises in China. It thus studies how regulatory instruments and enforcement can be matched feasibly to improve compliance. It explores changes in existing and in alternative regulatory arrangements that can contribute to ending a situation of pervasive regulatory violations.

This project will be carried out by Benjamin van Rooij and has been awarded a VENI Grant for innovative research by NWO.

This project falls under NCLC Line of Research no. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.